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Poverty is an outcome of the accountability and responsiveness of state institutions                 
Attacking Poverty, World Development Report, 2001
Azerbaijan is facing the danger of reduced economic growth, increased inequality, decreased child welfare, 
and greater vulnerability to economic and political shocks. All these are symptoms of a disease depicted within 
the “resource curse” paradigm2. Despite the gloomy picture described by some scholars, the “resource curse” 
is avoidable3 if the government takes complex sets of actions. The forthcoming policy study will address only 
one of variables to be employed under the struggle against “resource curse”, i.e. improved transparency and 
accountability in use of oil resources. This paper describes symptoms of resource curse in Azerbaijan, exam-
ines steps already undertaken to enhance accountability and transparency in use of the country’s oil resources, 
and brieﬂy outlines some of the main hypotheses to be examined in the forthcoming policy study.
Resource curse in Azerbaijan4
Azerbaijan’s economy is becoming increasingly dependent on oil, as illustrated through the “resource depend-
ence indicators”. About 74% of foreign direct investment is concentrated in the oil and gas sector5. Hydro-
carbon sector brings half of the tax revenue, with one third of budget revenue coming from the State Oil 
Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The oil sector’s large share in trade is more than 85% of exports6. Increases 
in inequality, a decline in growth and deterioration in social welfare are seen as some of the harmful effects of 
1  Leyla Karimli is an International Policy Fellow working in the Combating the Resource Curse policy research group. More details of her 
work can be found at http://www.policy.hu/karimli.
2  For more details on harmful effects of resource curse see Michael Ross, “Extractive Sectors and the Poor” Oxfam America Report 2001, 
Michael Ross, “The Political Economy of the Resource Curse” World Politics 51 (January 1999), 297-322, Michael Ross, “Does Oil 
Hinder Democracy”, World Politics 53 (April 2001), 325–61, Terry Lynn Karl, “Understanding the Resource Curse” in Covering Oil: A 
Reporter’s Guide to Energy and Development published by Revenue Watch, Open Society Institute and Initiative for Policy Dialogue, 
20053  UNICEF, 2006, The State of the Worlds Children 2006. Excluded and Invisible.
3  Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Making Natural Resources into a Blessing rather than a Curse”, in Covering Oil: A Reporter’s Guide to Energy and 
Development.
4  Brief historical summary of petroleum wealth in Azerbaijan has been described in “Caspian Oil Windfall: Who Will Beneﬁt” published by
Caspian Revenue Watch/Open Society Institute, 2003 (Chapter 5 produced by Sabit Bagirov, Ingilab Akhmedov and Svetlana Tsalik), 
and “Some Common Concerns: Imagining BP’s Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey Pipelines System” published by PLATFORM, The Corner 
House, Friends of Earth International, CEE Bankwatch Network, Campagna per la Riforma della Banca Mondiale, and the Kurdish Hu-
man Rights Project.
5  EU/Azerbaijan Country Strategy Paper.
6  John Wakeman-Linn, Paul Mathieu and Bert van Selm, “Oil funds and revenue management in transition economies: the cases of Az-
erbaijan and Kazakhstan”
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the resource curse. Inequality in Azerbaijan, as illustrated by the GINI coefﬁcient, increased from 0.3 in 1989-
90 to 0.5 in 20007, with inequality widening along geographic area and various social strata. Economic growth, 
although impressive, does not apply to the non-oil sector.   The average rate of GDP growth for the period 1995 
– 2005 was approximately 13%, with real GDP growth in 2005 achieving 26%8. However, the increased GDP 
growth in oil sector is accompanied with the signiﬁcant decline in the non-oil sector9. Although 42% of GDP10 is 
concentrated in hydrocarbon sector this accounts for only 1% of employment. One cannot expect the oil sector 
to contribute signiﬁcantly into reducing the high unemployment rate in Azerbaijan (11% in 2003)11.
Despite considerable GDP growth, poverty remains signiﬁcant in Azerbaijan. World Bank ﬁgures place Az-
erbaijan among those countries that, within the last 20 years, fell back from MIC (middle income) to LIC (low 
income) status and did not manage to return back to MIC12. The poverty assessment report of 2002 shows 
that the poverty level is as high as 47%13. The latest government report claims poverty being decreased to 
27% within less than 2 years. Such a drastic change in poverty level is controversial, and civil society and in-
ternational community contest ofﬁcial statistics. In the UN’s Human Development Index, Azerbaijan is ranked
101st, with the smallest per capita health expenditure and the highest child mortality rate among former Soviet 
Union countries14. Child mortality and infant mortality rates for the period 1991 – 2000 were estimated to be 
as high as 92/1,000 and 81/1,000 consequently15. The discrepancy between these ﬁgures and ofﬁcial statistics
is very signiﬁcant16. Drawbacks in the registration of childbirth and maternal mortality17 suggest that ofﬁcial
statistics underestimate the scale of the problem. In terms of the political situation, the country is ranked as 
semi-consolidated authoritarian regime18. All elections, including presidential elections in 2003, municipality 
elections in 2004 and the most recent parliamentary elections in 2005 were marked by gross manipulations, 
signiﬁcant irregularities and fraudulent behaviour in favour of ruling party19.
7  UNICEF Innocenti Research Center (2003), Social Monitor 2003. Florence: UNICEF, p.93.
8  Country Proﬁle 2006, Ministry of Economic Development. http://www.economy.gov.az.
9  Rupinder Singh – Juhani Laurila,” Azerbaijan: Recent Economic Developments and Policy Issues in Sustainability of Growth”, 1999 
http://www.bof.ﬁ/boﬁt/eng/6dp/abs/pdf/dp0599.pdf.
10  Asian Development Outlook, http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2006/aze.asp.
11  Unemployment data is marked by signiﬁcant discrepancy. The State Employment Services reported unemployment rate of 1.2%. SP-
PRED document refers to census data from 1999 to give a non-registered unemployment rate. 11 Achieving the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals: the Middle-Income Countries, a strategy for DFID: 2005-2008, p. 5.
12  Achieving the Millennium Development Goals: the Middle-Income Countries, a strategy for DFID: 2005-2008, p. 5.
13  Annual Repot (2003) on the State Programme on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development, p.17
14  http://www3.who.int/whosis/country/compare.cfm?country=AZE&indicator=PcTotEOHinIntD&language=english.
15  Reproductive Health Survey; According to the survey, infant and under ﬁve mortality declined in the 1996-2001 period, compared to
the 1991-95 period (infant mortality from 74.4 to 85.9 and under ﬁve mortality from 96.8 to 88.4).
16  As indicated in the SPPRED Report, ofﬁcial statistics records infant mortality in Azerbaijan in 2002 as being 12.8 per thousand live
births, and the under-ﬁve mortality rate as reaching 23.1 per 1000 in 2002.
17  Ofﬁcial statistics does not record death from pregnancy and postpartum complications at home as maternal mortality; it does not
register births of infants who die shortly after births. In addition early neonatal deaths and early deaths of premature infants are 
registered as stillbirths. For more information see “Primary Health Care Assessment” developed by USAID, and UNCEIF’s Multiple 
Indicator Cluster Survey. 
18  Democracy Score Ranking 2006, Freedom House. 
19  For detailed information on election irregularities in Azerbaijan see reports by OSCE, Ofﬁce for Democratic Institutions and Human
Rights, International Helsinki Federation For Human Rights, and Human Rights Watch. 
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Serious shortfalls in government accountability prevent poor people from capitalizing on the country’s natu-
ral and human resources.  Azerbaijan is continuously amongst the most corrupt countries in the world20. 
Amongst twenty two transition countries, it has the highest average bribe payment, as a percentage of annual 
revenues21. As indicated in the Joint Staff Assessment Report, “the impact of budgetary spending is adversely 
affected by serious governance problems at all levels”22. Although this statement was made with regard to 
Azerbaijan’s health sector, it describes, not less accurately, the state of other sectors.
Government agencies responsible for budget processes are very reluctant to open up for civil society partici-
pation despite ofﬁcial commitment to international agreements with the IMF, WB, Council of Europe, etc. The
State Programme on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development (SPPRED) was adopted in February 2003 
to “produce national strategy for poverty reduction”; it was supposed to be a “focal point for ensuring better 
coordination of external (donor) assistance aimed at poverty reduction”23. However, ﬁnancial allocations within
the SPPRED were not reﬂected properly in the state budget document, making budget tracking for SPPRED
very difﬁcult. As indicated in the WB Country Assistance Strategy, one of the major areas to be improved is
“further reﬁnement of costing and prioritization of actions consistent with annual budget envelopes, within the
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework and Public Investment Programme”. A lack of transparency and effec-
tiveness in resource management remains a signiﬁcant problem24. It is very difﬁcult to track national expendi-
ture because there is a very vague, if any, link between expenditure choices and reform plans (or declared 
policy objectives). The lack of linkage between reforms and expenditure implications of these reforms is also 
due to very poor cost evaluation of policies/ reforms as stipulated in the PRSP.
Decision-making is highly centralized. Coordination between various government agencies is poor with sub-
stantial political competition between different ministries and key ofﬁcials within the government for access
to ﬁnancial resources. Citizen can participate in decision-making process through voting, by self-organizing
into non-governmental agencies, and through institutions of self-governance established in 1999. The institu-
tion of local self-governance, however, is accompanied by a great degree of confusion and decentralisation 
reforms have a long way to go. According to Article 142 of the Constitution, local self-governance is carried 
out by municipalities formed through elections. However, de facto, local self-governance is exercised through 
the Executive Committees, which are Presidential appointees at local level. Executive Committees manage all 
ﬁnancial resources and allocations from the state budget. In many cases, taxes that should feed the munici-
pality budget (as stipulated in the legislation) are misallocated into regional tax departments. The tax-raising 
capacity of municipalities is very limited; taxes on the most lucrative assets and activities remain under control 
of executive committees. In many cases, subsidies from the state budget remain the only revenue sources of 
municipalities. These subsidies and other forms of allocations from the central state budget are not regulated 
by any speciﬁc mechanisms or procedures. Although the legislation deﬁnes municipalities as independent from
any local state administration authority25, municipalities, in many cases, are treated by Executive Committees 
as their junior-level employees. Central government authorities are very reluctant to transfer power to local 
self-governance, and Executive Committees are very anxious about losing control over regional property. In 
most cases, the Executive Committees usurp areas delegated to municipality jurisdiction, and actual power at 
local level is exercised by Executive Committees.
  
20  Global Corruption Report, Transparency International.
21  http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/quinghua_presentation_hellman.pdf. 
22  Joint Staff Assessment Report, p. 7 2004.
23  Annual Repot (2003) on the State Programme on Poverty Reduction and Economic Development, p.6. 
24  http://www.ekspert.az/download/report.doc. 
25  The Law on the Status of Municipalities, Article 14.4.
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26  http://www.oilfund.az. 
27  http://www.eiti-az.org. 
28  Ministry of Industry and Energy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, Ministry of Economic, Development, 
and State Statistics Committee. 
29  “Three Views of EITI Implementation”, Economic Research Centre, 2006.
Transparency may help to avoid resource curse
For resource abundance to be translated into economic development and prosperity, Azerbaijan needs effec-
tive, transparent and accountable governance structures at place. Certain measures have already been under-
taken to ensure transparent and accountable management of oil resources in Azerbaijan. The State Oil Fund 
of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ) has been created to perform stabilisation and saving functions. It publishes wide range 
of information on its internet site, including annual revenue reports26. The roles and responsibilities of SOFAZ, 
its management and revenue structure, as well as challenges in improving it transparency and accountability 
has been analysed in great detail in the publication ‘Caspian Oil Windfalls.’ This paper will not go into further 
details on that subject, instead, the question t here could be “what is the internet accessibility for poor women 
and men, speciﬁcally in rural area of Azerbaijan?” and “how technical are reports provided by SOFAZ: are they
easy to understand by people who does not hold any technical expertise in that area? ”
Azerbaijan has joined the EITI (Extract Industries Transparency Initiative)27. The EITI National Commission 
comprised of 5 ministries28, SOFAZ, the NGO EITI Coalition and an independent auditing company has been 
established to ensure transparent and accountable management of oil revenues and expenditures. The NGO 
Coalition consists of 18 local NGO. The recent survey29 on attitudes of government agencies to EITI cam-
paign shows that 3 government agencies, ofﬁcially members of EITI National Commission, are unaware of
this initiative. Out of 11 government agencies covered by the survey, only 3 adopted the practice of browsing 
the internet site of EITI National Coalition. Interestingly, both government and NGO Coalition representatives 
assessed existing public oversight mechanisms as ineffective. But each side consider this to be the other’s 
responsibility: the government blamed the NGO Coalition due to its “inability to offer effective public oversight 
mechanisms”; whereas NGO Coalition members argue that public oversight will be improved if, among other 
measures, the government involves NGO representatives into SOFAZ Supervisory Board and ﬁnances the
monitoring of projects by NGO Coalition members. Unfortunately the survey does not address questions about 
the transparency and accountability of NGO Coalition members to their constituencies. The main concern was 
that civil society has hardly been able to provide informed feedback to the government. Highly centralized de-
cision-making in the country is not the only difﬁculty faced by civil society in Azerbaijan. Unfortunately, NGOs
in Azerbaijan are far from being fully transparent and representative. Among other difﬁculties, civil society in
Azerbaijan faces a major challenge of legitimacy [whether NGOs truly represent interests of poor women and 
men?] and capacity [whether recommendations developed by NGO are bolstered by evidence rather than be-
ing based on certain political preferences?].
Informed public participation beyond transparency
Attempts towards increased transparency and accountability regarding oil resources in Azerbaijan were focus-
ing predominantly on disclosing information about management of oil revenues and expenditure. However, 
as suggested by Richard G. Steiner, the concept of transparency shall be distinguished from that of informed 
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public participation30: “transparency is a necessary but not sufﬁcient component of informed public participa-
tion in democracy. To have an active voice, the public, or at least a representative body of the public, needs to 
have a legitimate and formalised role overseeing and interacting with industry and government”.
Later investigation in a forthcoming policy paper will analyse whether municipalities in Azerbaijan can serve 
as “representative body of the public”. The research is built on the assumption that elected local government 
has an inherent capacity to be held accountable31. Thus, elected local government institutions can be in a 
better position to channel people’s voices and to monitor decisions around management of oil revenue and 
expenditure, at least the portion of these revenues allocated as development funds. The researcher believes 
that elected local government institutions are best placed to implement at least three out of six activities in 
monitoring oil revenues and expenditures, namely: (1) simplifying and disseminating information; (2) identify-
ing and setting priorities; and (3) tracking revenues and expenditures32. In addition, municipalities are best 
placed to hold public hearings to “gauge public opinion on spending priorities” as suggested by Caspian Rev-
enue Watch33.
The main hypothesis to be tested are that informed public participation in management of oil revenues and 
expenditures is more effective when implemented through institutions of local governance. There are cases 
where local governance institutions successfully manage resource, including distribution and implementation 
of development and poverty alleviation funds. The author acknowledges that, to date, very little evidence 
demonstrates a direct relationship between decentralized management of development funds and poverty 
reduction.
In addition, there is a risk that the local elite will capture control over decentralized resources, thus having no 
impact on poverty reduction. This risk will be examined throughout the forthcoming research. The proposed 
research will not address the most effective way of spending oil money. Neither will it be argued that simply in-
volving more citizens into debates will improve decisions. There is a high risk that discussions around expendi-
ture of oil revenue government may fall victim of highly politicised debates and it may surrender to populist 
decisions rather than considering long-term strategic objectives. All these risks will be taken into consideration 
when examining options for most effective and viable mechanisms of informed public participation in manage-
ment of oil resources in Azerbaijan.
30  Richard G. Steiner, “Models of Public Oversight of Government and Industry” in Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Beneﬁt, p. 71.
31  Harry Blair, “Participation and Accountability at the Periphery: Democratic Local Governance in Six Countries”, World Development, 
Vol.28, No.1, pp. 21-39, 2000.
32  These are main activities suggested for monitoring of oil revenues and expenditures, i.e. (1) simplifying and disseminating infor-
mation; (2) identifying and setting priorities; (3) inﬂuencing revenue policies; (4) identifying trends and providing projections; (5)
highlighting best practices; and (6) tracking revenues and expenditures. For more information see Jim Shultz, Follow the Money: 
a Guide to Monitoring Budgets and Oil and Gas Revenues, Revenue Watch OSI, cHimenter for Policy Studies at CEU, International 
Budget Project.
 33  Caspian Oil Windfalls: Who Will Beneﬁt, Caspian Revenue Watch, OSI/Central Eurasia Project, p. 28.
